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I. 
THE PRESUMPTION OF RELIABILITY FOR REPORTS FROM 
IDENTIFIED CITIZENS SHOULD NOT BE DISCARDED 
SIMPLY BECAUSE THE CITIZEN INFORMANT HAS A 
RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SUSPECT 
As discussed in the State's opening brief, when a citizen calls police to report 
a crime, that citizen is presumed reliable unless (1) the call is anonymous, or (2) the 
citizen is a police informant who is receiving something from the police in exchange 
for the information. See generally Pet. Br. 19-20. Thus, "reliability and veracity are 
generally assumed" when the call comes from an identified citizen who is receiving 
nothing for the report. State v. Norris, 2001 UT 104,118,48 P.3d 872. 
In the opinion below, however, the court of appeals created an exception to 
this rule for callers who have "some kind of personal involvement with the 
suspect." State v. Roybal 2008 UT App 286, ^  11,191 P.3d 822. In effect, the court of 
appeals has now held that the presumption of reliability is rebutted by the 
relationship between the informant and the suspect. According to the court of 
appeals, this is warranted because calls are "less reliable" when there is a mere 
"possibility that the citizen is making allegations out of anger, out of jealousy, or for 
other personal reasons." Id. 
In his brief to this Court, defendant argues that this new rule is necessary in 
order to prevent innocent persons from being pulled over based on false police 
reports. Resp. Br. 14. Defendant also argues that this rule is supported by a wide 
number of cases from both Utah courts and from other jurisdictions. Resp. Br. 19. 
Both arguments should be rejected. 
A. Under settled Supreme Court precedent, false 911 calls are dealt 
with by prosecuting those who make the false calls, not by 
restricting the ability of all citizens to obtain police assistance. 
Defendant argues that the court of appeals' rule is necessary to prevent "an 
individual's essential liberty" from being "deprived because any person who was 
mad, upset, jealous, or plain mean [had] the power to call 911 and launch a false 
complaint." Resp. Br. 14. 
Defendant's argument fails to recognize that the Supreme Court has already 
accounted for this potential problem in its reasonable suspicion jurisprudence. 
Rather than preemptively restricting the use of crime reports, however, the 
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Supreme Court has instead held that the remedy is to prosecute those who actually 
file false reports. 
This was one of the central rationales of Florida v. J.L., wherein the Court 
expressly distinguished between reports filed by anonymous informants and those 
filed by identified citizen informants. 529 U.S. 266,270 (2000). As discussed in the 
State's opening brief, Pet. Br. 20-21, J.L. refused to apply a presumption of reliability 
to anonymous reports precisely because the informants in such cases cannot be 
punished if the report proves false. 529 U.S. at 270. By contrast, identified 
informants are subject to penalty, and the Court accordingly did not impose any sort 
of reliability requirement on such reports. Id. 
In subsequent cases, a wide number of courts have accordingly stressed that 
the threat of punishment is a sufficient remedy for the problem of false reports. In 
United States v. Jenkins, for example, the Tenth Circuit held that when police know 
the identity of an informant, a "reasonable person in such circumstances would 
realize that in all likelihood the police could, if they so chose, . . . hold him 
responsible if his allegations turned out to be fabricated. This provides a 
disincentive for making false allegations and a court can consider this factor in 
weighing the reliability of the tip/ ' 313 F.3d 549, 554 (10th Cir. 2002) (quotations 
and citation omitted). Other courts have followed this rule. See, e.g., United States v. 
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Elmore, 482 F.3d 172,180 (2d Cir. 2007); United States v. Valentine, 232 F.3d 350,354 
(3d Cir. 2000); United States v. Christmas, 222 F.3d 141,144 (4th Cir. 2000). 
In Utah, this punishment primarily occurs in two ways. First, under Utah 
Code Annotated § 76-8-506(1) (West 2004), it is a class B misdemeanor to 
"knowingly give[ ] or cause[ ] to be given false information to any peace officer or 
any state or local government agency or personnel with a purpose of inducing the 
recipient of the information to believe that another has committed an offense." This 
Court has affirmed convictions for violating this statute. See State v. Bagley, 681 P.2d 
1242,1243-44 (Utah 1984); State v. McGehee, 639 P.2d 148,149-50 (Utah 1981). 
Second, a person who files a false report might also be subject to civil 
penalties as well. For example, if the person files a false police report against an ex-
spouse, the reporting person might theoretically risk sanction in any ongoing 
custody disputes. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.4 (West 2004) (allowing a court to 
modify a custody order if it has "become unworkable or inappropriate under 
existing circumstances"). 
These two remedies undercut much of the concern that was expressed by the 
court of appeals in this case and in Salt Lake City v. Bench, 2008 UT App 30,177 P.3d 
655. In fact, Bench itself provides a clear example of how this rule is supposed to 
work. 
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In Bench, the defendant's ex-wife called 911 to report that the defendant, "who 
had just dropped off their children at her home. . . , had transported the children in 
his vehicle while intoxicated/' Id. at % 2. The ex-wife later explained that when 
defendant dropped their children off, he "smelled strongly of alcohol/7 "had poor 
balance/' had "glassy eyes," and "slurred his speech." Id. at If 19 n.4. As a result of 
this report, an officer pulled defendant over a short time later and conducted an 
investigation. Id. at Tf 3. 
In this circumstance, it would have been readily apparent to the officer if the 
report had been false. For example, it would not have taken long for the officer to 
determine whether the defendant had any noticeable signs of intoxication, such the 
smell of alcohol, glassy eyes, or slurred speech. Cf. State v. Abell, 2003 UT 20, f 37, 
70 P.3d 98 (stating that the question of whether officers have reasonable suspicion 
that a driver is impaired "can be made very quickly" "where the smell of alcohol is 
obvious"). Given this, if the officer had found no signs of intoxication, Bench's ex-
wife would have been subject to criminal prosecution for filing a false report. Not 
only would she have faced up to six months in jail as a result, but she might have 
also faced sanction in any ongoing custody proceedings with her ex-husband. 
The court of appeals' opinion therefore fashions a new remedy for a perceived 
problem that has already been resolved. And rather than specifically targeting the 
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wrongdoers, the court of appeals' rule instead targets all citizens, including those 
who have voluntarily called 911, identified themselves, and asked for police 
assistance in a time of need. 
This Court should therefore overturn the court of appeal's decision to restrict 
the presumption of reliability in such cases, thereby ensuring that identified citizens 
are still able to receive prompt emergency assistance. 
B. The court of appeals' rule is not only unsupported by any Utah 
decision, but it also runs contrary to the great weight of authority 
from other jurisdictions. 
In the State's opening brief, the State cited to a large number of cases that had 
treated identified citizens as reliable support for establishing probable cause or 
reasonable suspicion, even though the citizens were reporting on family or friends. 
See generally Pet. Br. 22-27. In response, defendant points to the court of appeals' 
discussion of this issue in Salt Lake City v. Bench, wherein the same panel that 
ultimately issued Roybal first held that the presumption of reliability does not attach 
to reports filed by family or friends. Resp. Br. 19 (citing Bench, 2008 UT App 30, 
f 15). As noted in defendant's brief, the court of appeals in Bench cited to seven 
cases in support of its claim that a relationship between the informant and the 
suspect makes a 911 call "less reliable." Resp. Br. 19 (citing Bench, 2008 UT App 30, f 
15). Contrary to defendant's claim, however, the majority of the cited cases do not 
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actually support the court of appeals7 decision to create a relationship exception to 
the presumption of regularity. 
Of the seven cases, two were from Utah courts: State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 
1229 (Utah 1996), and State v. White, 856 P.2d 656 (Utah App. 1993). Resp. Br. 19. But 
neither opinion goes as far as defendant or the court of appeals suggest. 
In Anderson, officers acted on a tip provided by the defendant's "former live-
in girlfriend/7 910 P.2d at 1233. Although this Court noted that "the police77 had 
"expressed some question77 of the girlfriend's veracity "due to a bias she may have 
harbored toward her ex-paramour,77 this Court ultimately discounted these 
suspicions because the tip had been corroborated by other sources. Id. at 1233-34. 
In so doing, however, this Court did not specifically analyze the concerns that "the 
police77 had, let alone endorse them. See id. In contrast to the court of appeals 
below, this Court in Anderson did not rule that the presumption of reliability for an 
identified informant is overcome whenever the informant has a relationship with 
the suspect. See id. Instead, this Court expressed no opinion on that issue at all. 
The court of appeals7 opinion in White is similarly unhelpful to defendant's 
argument. In that case, the defendant's ex-wife had called police and informed 
them that she had been in a domestic disturbance with the defendant earlier that 
day. White, 856 P.2d at 657. The issue before the court of appeals was not whether 
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this created reasonable suspicion for a stop, however, but whether it also supported 
the officers' subsequent decision to frisk the defendant. Id. at 659. 
While the court of appeals ultimately concluded that the frisk was improper, 
the court nevertheless concluded that there had been reasonable suspicion for the 
stop. Id. at 662, 664. According to the court, a stop was appropriate because of the 
ex-wife's claim that there had been a domestic altercation earlier that day. The court 
accordingly "recognize[d] that domestic incidents can be violent and that police 
intervention in these volatile situations can be extremely dangerous." Id. Further, 
"[although the officer's knowledge of the alleged domestic incident was minimal, 
they had neither time nor opportunity to corroborate the informant's allegations 
prior to responding to the call." Id. Thus, White did not hold that a report from an 
ex-wife cannot support reasonable suspicion. To the contrary, White recognized that 
such reports can be relied on as a basis for an investigatory stop. 
As for the non-Utah authority cited in defendant's brief, Resp. Br. 19, that 
authority generally does not support defendant's argument either. 
For example, defendant and the court of appeals cite to the Fourth Circuit's 
decision in United States v. Hodges, 705 F.2d 106 (4th Cir. 1983). Resp. Br. 19 (citing 
Bench, 2008 UT App 30, f^ 15). In Hodges, however, the Fourth Circuit specifically 
concluded that the strained relationship could not be used to overcome the 
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informant's presumed reliability. "Although the record disclose[d] that" the 
informant and the suspect had separated, the court was "not persuaded that it is 
proper to infer a lack of credibility from this fact alone." Id. at 108. Moreover, even 
if the court had "accepted] the inference" that the informant "harbored ill will 
toward [the suspect]," the court still insisted that "her credibility cannot be rejected 
on this ground." Id. 
Defendant's reliance on State v. Olson, 66 P.3d 297 (Mont. 2003), is similarly 
misplaced. Resp. Br. 19. Defendant relies on Olson for the proposition that 
"evidence of a 'strained relationship' between informant his defendant wife, who 
had separated from him, may indicate that the informant had mixed motives." 
Resp. Br. 19 (citing Bench, 2008 UT App 30, t 15). While the Montana Supreme 
Court did conclude that the informant had "mixed motives" when he reported on 
his wife's criminal activities, the court then specifically rejected the proposition that 
these mixed motives had overcome the presumption of reliability. Olson, 66 P.3d at 
303. According to the court, while there was "evidence" that the informant and his 
estranged wife "had a strained relationship, that fact, by itself, is not sufficient to 
overcome the presumption that he acted as a good citizen" when he reported her 
criminal activity to police. Id. 
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Defendant also points to State v. Morris, 444 So.2d 1200 (La. 1984). Resp. Br. 19 
(citing Bench, 2008 UT App 30, <|[ 15). In Morris, the informant reported on his 
estranged wife's criminal activities, and the Louisiana Supreme Court later noted 
that the informant stood to gain in their custody battle as a result of the report. 
Morris, 444 So.2d at 1202,1204. In spite of this, the Morris court still affirmed the 
search warrant that was based on the informant's tip, concluding that the 
"magistrate could have found it more probable than not that [the informant] was a 
credible informant" who had offered "a correct report of drug activity." Id. 
While the decisions in United States v. Phillips, 727 F.2d 392, 393-94 (5th Cir. 
1984), and Minnesota v. Lindquist, 205 N.W. 2d 333, 335 (Minn. 1973), do support 
defendant's position, Resp. Br. 19, those decisions are contrary to the wide number 
of cases from other jurisdictions that have relied on tips from family or friends 
without reservation. See generally Pet. Br. 22-27 (cited cases). This includes at least 
two decisions from the United States Supreme Court that relied on tips from ex-
spouses or wives. See Pet. Br. 22-23 (discussing Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727 
(1984), and Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326 (2001)). 
In his responsive brief, defendant distinguishes Upton and McArthur by 
noting that the tips in both cases were more detailed than the tip at issue here. 
Resp. Br. at 21-22. But the question of whether a tip is reliable is separate from 
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the question of whether the tip contained enough information to justify a stop. 
In Alabama v. White, for example, the Supreme Court specifically distinguished 
between the question of whether a tip provided enough "quantity or conten t . . . 
to establish probable cause/' and the question of whether the tip was sufficiently 
"reliable." 496 U.S. 325,330 (1990). 
Thus, the critical point is that both Upton and McArthur expressly relied on 
tips that were provided by disgruntled women who had recently ended their 
relationships with the suspect. See McArthur, 531 U.S. at 328-332; Upton, 466 U.S. at 
729-34. And in both cases, the Supreme Court held that those tips supported the 
stops in question, McArthur, 531 U.S. at 328-332; Upton, 466 U.S. at 729-34, thereby 
implicitly rejecting the suggestion that such tips are constitutionally suspect. 
To be clear, the State does not contend that an informant's troubled history 
with a suspect can never be factored into a reasonable suspicion analysis. If an 
officer knew that a caller had a history of filing false police reports against her ex-
husband, for example, that history may very well rebut the presumption of 
reliability. But where there is no history of dishonesty, the presumption of 
reliability should not be discarded. A history of fighting does not necessarily equate 
to a history of lying, and this Court should reject defendant's argument to the 
contrary. 
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II. 
THE FACT THAT DEFENDANT HAD LEFT THE PREMISES 
DID NOT MEAN THAT THERE WAS NO DANGER 
In the State's opening brief, the State also argued that dispatchers should not 
be required to conduct a reliability analysis for emergency 911 calls. Pet. Br. 30-34. 
In response, defendant claims that there was no emergency in this case because 
defendant had left the home before his girlfriend made her 911 call. Resp. Br. 24-26. 
Contrary to defendant's claim, the fact that defendant had left the home did 
not mean that there was no longer a reasonable suspicion that anyone was in 
danger. In the proceedings below, the responding officer specifically testified that 
based on his prior experiences as a police officer, there is a probability that domestic 
violence suspects will return to the home within a short time if officers do not 
quickly respond to the scene. R. 97:8-9,22. Given that defendant and his girlfriend 
had just been involved in a drunken confrontation, it was reasonable for the officer 
to suspect that the threat had not entirely dissipated just because defendant had 
temporarily left the home. 
Moreover, in addition to the suspicion of domestic violence, the officer also 
had reason to suspect that defendant was driving while intoxicated. In a prior case, 
the court of appeals itself noted that a "'motor vehicle in the hands of a drunken 
driver is an instrument of death. It is deadly, it threatens the safety of the public, 
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and that threat must be eliminated as quickly as possible/" Kaysville City v. 
Mulcahy, 943 P.2d 231, 237 (Utah App. 1997) (citation omitted), overruled on other 
grounds by State v. Saddler, 2004 UT 105, t l 8-10,104 P.3d 1265. 
Here, defendant's drunken girlfriend had called 911 and informed the 
dispatcher that she and defendant had been drinking together. As explained in the 
State's opening brief and below in Point III. A, this created a reasonable suspicion 
that defendant was driving while intoxicated. Given this, the officer had reason to 
believe that defendant was not just a continuing threat to his girlfriend, but also to 
everyone who happened to share a road with him. Thus, by getting into his car and 
leaving, defendant did not end the danger, but instead simply amplified its scope. 
In short, the 911 system is designed for speed, not deliberation, and courts 
have accordingly avoided placing roadblocks in the path of emergency responders. 
See generally Pet. Br. 30-35. Under these circumstances, the 911 dispatcher should 
not have been required to spend time conducting an uncertain reliability analysis of 
defendant's girlfriend before dispatching an officer to investigate these potential 
dangers. 
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III. 
CONTRARY TO DEFENDANTS CLAIM, THE 911 CALL 
CONTAINED SUFFICIENT INFORMATION TO SUPPORT A 
REASONABLE SUSPICION OF EITHER DUI OR DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE 
In addition to assailing the call's reliability, defendant also argues that the call 
did not provide sufficient evidence to support a reasonable suspicion of either DUI 
or domestic violence. Both arguments should be rejected. 
A. The 911 call contained sufficient information to support a 
reasonable suspicion of DUI. 
Defendant claims that there was insufficient evidence to support a reasonable 
suspicion of DUI. Defendant first argues that the call did not provide enough 
information about defendant's body mass or what defendant had drunk. Resp. Br. 
17,35. Defendant also argues that although the officer observed him driving a slow, 
circuitous pattern, this did not support the stop because there were innocent 
explanations for this behavior. Resp. Br. 35. Both arguments should be rejected. 
First, defendant argues that there was no reasonable suspicion of DUI 
because his girlfriend did not provide any information regarding his physical size or 
what he drunk. Resp. Br. 17,35. As further explained by the court of appeals in its 
opinion below, "the statement that a person has been drinking, by itself... does not 
provide an adequate basis on which to rationally infer that the person has an alcohol 
14 
level beyond the legally proscribed limit/7 Roybal, 2008 UT App 286, ^ 15. Instead, 
the court of appeals held that the caller needed to provide "facts regarding the 
amount of alcohol consumed, the type of beverage consumed, or the period of time 
over which the person consumed the alcohol, or the person's physical size." Id. 
Under settled reasonable suspicion jurisprudence, however, the court of 
appeals7 apparent decision to impose a specificity requirement on DUI calls was 
incorrect. To the contrary, this Court has "eschew [ed] bright-line rules" in the 
reasonable suspicion analysis, State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36, f^ 31,78 P.3d 590, and the 
United States Supreme Court has likewise "deliberately avoided reducing" 
reasonable suspicion "to a neat set of legal rules." United States i\ Arvizu, 534 U.S. 
266,274 (2002). Instead, the test is simply whether an officer's suspicion is based on 
something more than an "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch." State 
v. Markland, 2005 UT 26, 1 10,112 P.3d 507. 
Thus, while it may be helpful for a 911 dispatcher to know the suspect's size 
or what the suspect had drunk, these details are not required in order to create a 
reasonable suspicion of intoxication. For example, if an identified citizen called 911 
and told the dispatcher that she had just encountered a man in a parking lot who 
smelled of alcohol, had glassy eyes, and appeared to have balance issues, reasonable 
suspicion of intoxication would likely exist—regardless of whether the caller also 
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had any information about the "amount of alcohol consumed, the type of beverage 
consumed, or the period of time over which the person consumed the alcohol, or the 
person's physical size/' Roybal, 2008 UT App 286, «[j 15. 
In this case, defendant's girlfriend called 911 in an intoxicated, agitated state, 
and she then told the dispatcher that although she had been drinking with 
defendant, defendant was now driving away. R. 96: 1-3. Regardless of how big 
defendant was or how many drinks he had actually had, this information still 
created an articulable basis for the dispatcher to suspect that defendant was 
intoxicated as well. See Pet. Br. 36-39. The stop was appropriate on this basis alone. 
Second, defendant is also incorrect when he claims that the officer did not 
also develop reasonable suspicion when he observed defendant driving in a slow, 
circuitous pattern after receiving the 911 dispatch. According to defendant, this did 
not support reasonable suspicion because his behavior "could be consistent with 
other" innocent situations — such as being lost or trying to find an address. Resp. Br. 
35. But this Court specifically rejected that same argument in Markland, wherein it 
held that "'a determination that reasonable suspicion exists... need not rule out the 
possibility of innocent conduct.'" Markland, 2005 UT 26,110 (quoting Arvizu, 534 
U.S. at 277). Thus, regardless of whether there was an innocent explanation for 
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defendant's driving pattern, the stop was appropriate if the pattern was also 
reasonably indicative of intoxication. 
Moreover, although defendant now claims that he was simply driving 
"cautiously," Resp. Br. 11, the issue is not whether he was being cautious — the issue 
is whether he was driving suspiciously. And in this case, scientific studies and this 
officer's own professional experience both suggested that defendant's driving 
behavior was indicative of DUI. See Pet. Br. 41-44. The reason for this was twofold: 
first, defendant was driving at excessively slow speeds, and second, defendant was 
actively trying to avoid the police officer throughout the encounter. Id. When 
testifying below, the officer accordingly explained that, based on his experience and 
training, defendant's "driving pattern was very conducive to that of a drunk 
driver." R. 97: 9. This was sufficient to support the stop. 
B. The 911 call also contained sufficient information to support a 
reasonable suspicion of domestic violence. 
Defendant also claims that there was insufficient evidence to support a 
reasonable suspicion of domestic violence. According to defendant, the call did not 
support a stop because it was not "unambiguously indicative of a recent domestic 
dispute involving personal violence." Resp. Br. 30. This argument is incorrect. 
17 
Contrary to defendant's claim, officers can develop reasonable suspicion 
without an "unambiguous" report of a completed crime. Terry itself is illustrative. 
In that case, the officer observed nothing more than a group of men walking back 
and forth in front of a storefront window. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 4-8 (1968). 
Although this conduct was both legal and consistent with innocent behavior, it also 
suggested that the suspects might have been casing out the store for a robbery. Id. 
Given this, officers were allowed to investigate in order to "resolve the ambiguity" 
between these two differing explanations. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 
(2000). 
Here, defendant's girlfriend informed the 911 dispatcher that defendant had 
"just about" assaulted her. R. 96: 1-2. Like the conduct at issue in Terry, this 
statement was subject to different interpretations. Defendant's girlfriend could have 
meant that defendant had done nothing wrong at all, or she could have meant that 
defendant had actually tried assaulting her but simply failed, in which case it still 
would have been criminal. See Pet. Br. 46-48. In short, the statement reasonably 
suggested that something criminal had occurred, and officers were accordingly 
entitled to investigate the claim in order to "resolve [any] ambiguity." Wardlow, 528 
U.S. at 125. 
18 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should overturn the court of appeals' 
decision. 
Respectfully submitted May _!$, 2009. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
RYAlfLU. TENNEY 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Petitioner 
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